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INTRODUCTION
The Song of Deborah in the Book of Judges records a stunning
victory won by a coalition of Israelite tribes under Deborah and
Barak over a powerful army led by the Canaanite Sisera.1 The Song
is widely viewed by biblical scholars as among the most ancient of
all the biblical material;2 by its own terms, it describes a period very
early in the history of the Israelite occupation of the Promised
Land, a time when, there being "no king in Israel,"3 the common
life of the tribes was organized in a loose confederacy under the
guidance of "judges"-inspired leaders who would rise up to rescue
the Israelites when they faced aggression from other peoples.4
Deborah was one of these judges-and unusually, a woman as well.
This Article applies tools of legal-economic analysis to under-
stand the function of the Song of Deborah in the life of Ancient
Israel.' I argue that the text served a number of important norm-
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I SeeJudges 5:1-:31. The Song is reproduced in translation as an appendix to this
Article.
2 See, e.g.,J. ALBERTO SOGGIN,JUDGES: A COMMENTARY 80 (1981).
'Judges 19:1.
4 See generally ROBERT G. BOLING, JUDGES (1975).
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The Song of Deborah has not previously been analyzed from the perspective of
legal-economic theory. There is, however, a substantial literature on the Song of
Deborah in contemporary scholarship, much of it quite valuable. See, e.g., GOSTA W.
AHLSTROM, THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT PALESTINE 379-81 (1993); ROBERT ALTER, THE
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creating and norm-enforcing functions in the society. In its original
form, the Song of Deborah was most probably an oral recordation,
in a kind of intertribal account book, of how different groups
complied with a norm of mutual support during a time of military
exigency. The Song, along with other texts now lost, filled the
important social functions of cataloging and keeping straight the
obligations of the parties to a loose military alliance. The Song
itself is couched in a poetic form suitable for easy memorization in
an oral culture. Thus, the Song facilitated the continuation of a
socially useful organization when no military force was needed.
Over time, the importance of the specific historical information
recorded in the Song of Deborah became attenuated, and the Song-
modified by its extended passage within an oral tradition-may well
have assumed a broader role, a role that assured its preservation in
the culture even while other texts with similar functions were lost.
It came to epitomize the nature of the norms applicable to all the
Israelite tribes within the framework of a tribal confederacy. The
Song of Deborah stood, as it were, as a type of constitution or
foundational text of the political system in which it arose.
Eventually, the various groups living in the hill country of
Canaan coalesced into a nation-state, and the constitutional function
of the Song was superseded.6 A version of the Song was recorded,
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however, by the author (or authors) of the great national epic of the
Israelite people.' By recording the Song of Deborah as part of the
national epic, the author in a sense authenticated the epic itself.
The author, moreover, may have seen the Song as serving a
polemical purpose within the framework of an established nation-
state. The political function of the Song was no longer that of
enforcing a tribal confederacy, but rather that of illustrating the
defects of the confederacy form of government when contrasted
with its more powerful and stable successor, the monarchy.
Thus, I will suggest that the Song of Deborah served three
separate functions in the life of the people by the time a version of
the song was recorded in the Bible:
I. Originally, the Song of Deborah, along with similar texts,
served as a ledger in an oral culture for the recordation of inter-
tribal military obligations.
II. Later, it came to epitomize-and therefore to embody in
some constitutional sense-the overall structure of obligation and
cooperation that constituted the tribal confederacy.
III. Finally, the Song was recorded in writing in the national
epic of the Israelite people because it was a central part of the
cultural background, and because, within the social conditions of
the monarchy, it carried an implicit message about the superiority
of the monarchy as a form of government as compared with its
predecessor, the tribal confederacy.
This Article is structured as follows. I introduce the idea of
confederacy as a form of social organization and discuss the
349-65 (Thomas E. Levy ed., 1995).
'The topics of when the biblical text was recorded in writing and how much of
the written text is based on oral tradition are two of the leading problems in the
scholarship on the Hebrew Bible. There has never been a consensus on the degree
to which the Bible is a purely literary product, without a substantial prehistory in oral
tradition, on the one hand, or a written recordation of a primarily oral text, on the
other. Julius Wellhausen's early work viewed the text as essentially literary creations.
SeeJULIUS WELLHAUSEN, PROLECOMENA TO THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT ISRAEL (World
Pub. 1973) (1883). This view was eventually superseded by the position that many
biblical texts did evolve out of an earlier oral tradition, an insight developed most
prominently by Hermann Gunkel. See HERMANN GUNKEL, THE LEGENDS OF GENESIS,
THE BIBLICAL SAGA AND HISTORY (W.H. Carruth trans., Schocken Books 1964)
(1901). The literature on the question of oral versus written traditions is vast; the
leading general authority is still WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE
TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD (1982). For purposes of this Article, I suggest only
that there was an oral tradition in Ancient Israel and that the Song of Deborah in all
probability developed in the oral form prior to being recorded in the written Biblical
text.
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fundamental problem of defection and cooperation that, in a sense,
defines the confederate form. I then present the setting of the
tribal confederacy as described in the Book ofJudges, evaluated in
light of archaeological discoveries in the Canaanite highlands. I
examine the Song of Deborah itself and consider the extent to
which it bears out the predictions of the theoretical model. Finally,
I discuss the possible evolution of the Song within the overall
biblical corpus. The Article argues that the Song of Deborah was a
device by which norms of mutual cooperation were established,
promulgated, and enforced in the society in which the text
developed.
I. LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONFEDERACIES
Many social organizations take the form of affiliations of
autonomous entities in which different groups are required to
perform their obligations at different times and which are not
enforced by any state claiming a monopoly in the use of coercive
force. I will call these loose organizations, for want of a better
word, "confederacies" or "alliances."
Consider, for example, a political coalition or umbrella
organization. Such organizations are typically made up of separate,
autonomous groups, each with its own membership and objectives;
the coalition works because the constituent groups share certain
common interests that can be furthered by mutual support.
Because support for the umbrella organization is purely voluntary,
and because different issues are likely to impact constituent groups
in different ways, there is always the possibility that one of the
groups whose interests are not affected, or adversely affected, in a
particular case will defect rather than bear the costs of contributing
to the common effort. If that group defects, however, it cannot
reasonably expect cooperation from others in the future when an
issue arises that affects the defector more than other groups. What
maintains this type of organization is the anticipation by all groups
that, regardless of whether their interests are directly implicated by
any particular issue, they can expect to need the cooperation of
others. Therefore, they fulfill their obligations to the group even in
situations where the short term costs of complying outweigh
whatever benefits the constituents obtain.'
8 For a fascinating account of cooperation among ranchers in Shasta County,
California, together with valuable theoretical analysis, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
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It is not difficult to identify other voluntary coalitions in which
cooperation is ensured by the long-term, repeated nature of the
enterprise. Consider, for example, the norms of the labor move-
ment, under which union members do not cross picket lines set up
by other unions. There is no legal requirement to respect picket
lines, and the members of the nonstriking union may suffer some
reduction in pay if they adhere to the norm. Yet they do adhere to
the norm, in part for the obvious reason that they expect that, if
they were to go on strike, they could count on members of other
unions to respect their picket lines.
Another type of confederacy is a group of states joined in a
loose association for economic or military advantage. One of the
most famous of these systems is the American States under the
Articles of Confederation. The Federalist Papers, indeed, contain a
classic account of the difficulties faced by a confederate form of
government as compared with the advantages of the proposed
union.9
Similar norms can be found in international relations. Coun-
tries may commit themselves to providing mutual support and may
embody their commitments in treaties that have the ostensible form
of law. Yet treaties can be, and are, broken, and there is no
international court that can force a country to adhere to its treaty
obligations. Despite the fact that international treaties are largely
unenforceable, they command a fairly high degree of compliance.
The norms of international cooperation cause countries to come to
the aid of other countries, in large measure because they want to be
able to count on other countries helping them, should the need
arise.
Norms of mutual support and help underlie less public modali-
ties of cooperation as well. Consider marriage. The promise to
love and honor in the traditional marriage vow is made "for better
or for worse," "in sickness and in health." A marriage is a coopera-
tive enterprise for mutual support, and it is rare that both partners
in a marriage need help at the same time. Spouses give support to
one another in the expectation that they can count on help
themselves in the future. Many of the features of the unraveling of
marriage in divorce can be understood as consequences of the
ORDER WrrHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
9 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15-17, 21-22 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 18-20 (James
Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the inadequacies of the confederation
in preserving the peace and tranquility of the people).
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breakdown of the norm of mutual support and of the deleterious
effect on cooperation that occurs when the expectation of repeated
interactions is replaced by the anticipation of a final and permanent
separation.
While marriage is the most obvious interpersonal arrangement
in which norms of cooperation play a fundamental role, all forms of
friendship display similar features. Indeed, the importance of
mutual cooperation is stressed in folk sayings on the subject of
friendship-the derision accorded to the fair-weather friend is
explicitly due to the fact that the person fails to come through in a
pinch, whereas the adage "a friend in need is a friend indeed" can
be understood as emphasizing the fact that those who provide help
to a friend can expect true friendship (or at least a reliable return
of the favor) in the future.
A feature that pervades all of these arrangements is the fact that
they have duration. They persist over time-often long periods of
time. It is, indeed, this temporal dimension that gives rise to the
arrangements in the first place. If an exchange of favors could take
place simultaneously, each party could monitor the other's perfor-
mance and refuse to perform if he or she observed the other party's
default. The need for an ongoing relationship arises only when one
party has to perform based on trust that the other party will carry
through his or her obligations at a later date. Moreover, other
things being equal, the longer the duration of a relationship, the
greater benefits it offers. We may assume that in many cases the
parties to a relationship will tend to find themselves in need of
support on a random basis; they anticipate that they will require
help at some point in the future but they cannot predict when. In
such cases, a relationship that has the promise of long duration
enhances the probability that a performing party will in the future
be able to draw on the obligation and receive a return of help; if the
relationship lasted only a short time, the party asked to perform
first might never find himself or herself in need and might
therefore never receive a return on his or her investment.
As an arrangement for mutual support extends in time, however,
the limitation of memory becomes an issue. The strategy of
cooperation in these games, which all take the form of iterated
prisoner's dilemmas, works only if the parties remember who has
cooperated and who has defected in the past." Without memory,
" See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)
(discussing the prisoner's dilemma and the conditions that can foster cooperation
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there is no reason to cooperate because cooperation will not
necessarily be rewarded or defection penalized. The game breaks
down into a simple prisoner's dilemma in which defection is the
optimal strategy for the party who is asked to provide support.
Thus, for these arrangements to be self-sustaining, there must exist
some reliable and durable mechanism for recording events of
cooperation and defection during the lifetime of the organization.
Another feature of confederacies is that, for at least some of
them, publicity will be an important device for ensuring cooperation,
and therefore for maintaining the organization through time. This
may be important, for example, when there are three or more
participants in the group and the parties' abilities to monitor other
parties' performance varies depending on the circumstances. In
such a case, the party who needs help will typically have a better
ability to monitor the performance of the other parties than the
helping parties will have to monitor one another. Then, it would
make sense for the party being helped to publicize the performance
of all the helping parties (although the recipient of help may not
want to overstress the extent to which it owes a debt of gratitude to
others in the confederacy).
Publicity can also be important for the information it provides
third parties who are not already part of the group. Presumably,
the participants in a group may wish to enter other cooperative
arrangements. To the extent that their record of performing (or
not performing) their obligations within an existing group is
publicized outside the group, third parties receive information
about whether or not a particular party can be relied upon to
perform in another context. This sort of publicity not only
facilitates the formation of other groups, but also enhances the
probability of cooperation in the original group, because the impact
on other existing or potential groups enhances both the sanction for
defection and the rewards for performance in the original setting.
Publicity can take the form of a record of whether or not a
particular individual has cooperated in a particular case. More
generally, a person's record of cooperation or defection can become
crystallized in the form of a reputation, which is the judgment of a
broader community of a person's character or ability. Reputation
has certain advantages over raw data about whether a person or
entity has cooperated or defected in a given case. Reputation
among individuals, organizations, and nations).
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evaluates a person's behavior in many different settings, not just a
single incident; it can thus offer a more balanced picture than a
single account can. Extreme cases both good and bad can be
excluded, and events can be weighted according to their importance
and to whether they occurred recently or in the past. Mitigating
factors can be considered. Moreover, because reputation represents
the judgment of the community as a whole, it tends to be more
reliable than the report of a single individual, who may or may not
accurately assess the actual situation. Reputation is important in
various social and business settings and provides an incentive to
individuals and firms to cooperate even when doing so would not
be in their immediate short-term self-interest."
Cooperation is likely to be supported by social norms that go
beyond the expectation of future support by other groups. 12 The
prevailing culture in a particular region is likely to provide addi-
tional incentives to cooperate in socially beneficial arrangements,
incentives not directly tied to an expectation of future support from
other participants in the group.
Such cultural norms are likely to include religious values and
beliefs. Belief in a god or gods can induce cooperation even when
an individual's immediate, or even long-term, self-interest can best
be served by defecting. An alternative way of thinking about the
effect of religion is that it can alter the structure of self-interest.
For example, if a person has sworn an oath before the deity that he
or she will do a particular thing, the person may decide to perform
the oath simply out of fear of angering the god, quite apart from
whatever adverse consequences other people would impose for
defecting."
A society's culture is also likely to establish desirable status
categories that can be achieved by compliance and lost through
defection. In many societies, these categories are defined along a
continuum of honor. People seek the high status that comes with
a reputation for acting honorably and eschew behaviors that could
" See George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be
One Consequence, 94 Q.J. ECON. 749,750 (1980) (discussinghow fear of reputation loss
induces people to avoid violating customs, including inefficient customs).
2 On the emergence of norms and their role in encouraging social cooperation,
see generally JON ELsTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY (1989); EDNA ULLMANN-
MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary
Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1095 (1986).
" On the importance of oaths, vows, and other promises to the deity in the
culture of Ancient Israel, see generally Miller, Genesis, supra note 5, at 23-29.
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be judged dishonorable. Honor can also come to be an end in
itself, so that people may seek to act in honorable ways and avoid
dishonorable ones, even though their behavior is not observable by
others. Norms of honor can be internalized, and thus become part
of a person's structure of self-esteem; a person who has thoroughly
internalized the norm feels diminished in value if he or she acts
dishonorably.
Norms of honor are likely to assume heightened importance in
settings where the state, with its dispute-resolving and norm-creating
apparatus of police, courts, and the like, is weak or absent-for
example, in territories dominated by traditional clan authority
(traditional Mediterranean villages or Bedouin culture);14 or in
certain elite cultural segments whose members claim dispensation
from ordinary civil authority as to relations among themselves. 5
II. THE SETTING OF A TRIBAL CONFEDERACY
I now turn to an evaluation of the social setting for the Iron Age
I period, before the establishment of a monarchy in Ancient Israel.
The Book of Judges presents the tribes of Israel existing in a
confederacy of the sort analyzed above. 6 Each tribe is portrayed
as having a degree of autonomy, but also as being linked with other
14 SeeJACOB BLACK-MICHAUD, FEUDING SOCIETIES (1975);JULIAN PITT-RIVERS, THE
FATE OFSHECHEM (1977);Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honourand Social Status, in HONOURAND
SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANIAN SOCIETY 21, 24 (J.G. Peristiany ed., 1966).
" See Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duek Can These Gentlemen Be Acting
Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 322-25 (1984) (noting that in many cultures,
dueling was an accepted means for resolving affairs of honor among members of the
aristocracy but was considered inappropriate for lower classes).
,' I will not venture into the treacherous waters of speculating exactly who the
"Israelites" were. For a sampling of the discussion, see generally COSTA W.
AHLSTROM, WHO WERE THE ISRAELITES? (1986); GOTTWALD, supra note 5; GEORGE E.
MENDENHALL, THE TENTH GENERATION (1973). It does not matter, for purposes of
this Article, whether the Israelites were ethnically distinctive refugees from Egyptian
persecution, as in traditional accounts; Canaanite pioneers, as in some more recent
theories; or militant peasant revolutionaries, as in Gottwald's Marxian-inspired view.
It does appear that people living in the hill country of Canaan had a different
economic base and quality of life than their city-dwelling neighbors, and thus that
there would be cultural differences and economic conflicts between city and country
populations regardless of whether the "Israelites" constituted a distinctive ethnic
group. For a discussion of urban-rural differences, see ISRAEL FINKELSTEIN, THE
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE ISRAELITE SETTLEMENT (1988); Lawrence E. Stager, Archaeology,
Ecology, and Social History: Background Themes to the Song of Deborah, 40 SUPPLEMENTS
TO VETUS TESTAMENTUM 221, 222-23 (1988) (discussing "striking contrasts between
the hills and plains" and noting that Canaanites were comparatively wealthier than
their Israelite counterparts in the highland settlements).
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tribes by obligations of mutual defense and support. These
obligations became operative during times of military exigency,
when a heroic "judge" would arise out of the people, muster the
tribes, fight off a powerful enemy, and restore peace to the land. 17
The Bible's history of Israel in premonarchic times must be
evaluated with caution, given that much of the text reflects the
ideological and tendentious views of later authors. 8 Reconstruction
of the actual situation is difficult because of the paucity of extra-
biblical evidence on the nature of social relationships in the region.
From a methodological point of view, the most that we can hope for
is a model that satisfies four minimum criteria: (a) consistency with
itself (the model should not be based on conflicting premises or
posit events or situations that could not coexist); (b) consistency
with the text (the model should not contradict statements made in
the Bible, at least not without good reason); (c) consistency with
extrabiblical evidence (the model should not contradict the findings
of archaeology or of other indicators of the social or economic
conditions); and (d) consistency with human nature (the model
should not be premised on individuals acting in ways that are
contrary to ordinary human behavior as it is observed in other
settings).
These four criteria are loose enough to admit a range of
possible interpretations; within this range, the choice of interpreta-
tions is necessarily open. At the same time, these criteria do have
bite: their rigorous application casts doubt on interpretations that
posit human behavior being fundamentally different in those days.
Ancient Israel was unique in that it was the crucible in which
developed certain institutions that, in turn, evolved into major
religions of today. But there is no reason to believe that the people
" See, e.g.,Judges 3:9 (Othniel);Judges 3:15-:30 (Ehud);Judges 6-8 (Gideon);Judges
10:6-12:10 (Jephthah);Judges 13-16 (Samson).
" The fact that the Bible reflects these views of authors writing at a time later
than the events in question is common ground shared by nearly all secular biblical
scholars. For modern works that pay special attention to this feature of the biblical
text, see, for example, Niels P. Lemche, Early Israel: Anthropological and Historical
Studies on the Israelite Society Before the Monarchy, 37 SUPPLEMENTS TO VETUS
TESTAMENTUM (Frederick H. Cryes trans., 1985); P.K. McCarter, Jr., The Apology of
David, 99J. BIBLICAL LITERATURE 489,494-95 (1980); Keith W. Whitelam, The Symbols
of Power: Aspects of Royal Propaganda in the United Monarchy, 49 BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLO-
cIST 166, 168 (1986) (concluding that propaganda was used to legitimize the royal
rule of the Davidic monarchy and noting that the "narrative complex in 1 Samuel 9
to 1 Kings 2 represents an official interpretation of events in defense of David aimed
at an elite audience in the main centers of power").
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of those days were fundamentally different from people today.
They fought, cooperated, loved, hated, worked, played, strove for
prestige and wealth, and desired a better life for their children. In
short, they behaved as human beings have always behaved, subject
to the technological, ideological, and social constraints within which
they lived. To be creditable, any model of Ancient Israel must
accept that the inhabitants of the region were no less and no more
human than were people at other times and places.
Some earlier twentieth century scholars, notably Martin Noth,
have portrayed the Israelite tribes as operating in a system analo-
gous to the Greek Amphictionic leagues, with well-organized social,
military, and cultic obligations built on a twelve-tribe schema. 19 The
amphictionic hypothesis is oversimplified as a description of actual
social and political conditions." It is contradicted by the Book of
Judges itself, which does not disclose a tidy system of support for a
centralized cult sanctuary, but instead describes the tribes as
entering into unstable and shifting alliances, bickering over
territories, failing to support each other in times of need, and even
engaging in civil war.2" Nevertheless, the existence of a loose
alliance or confederacy of groups organized for purposes of mutual
support in military emergencies appears plausible, even if the actual
practice was complex and confused.
There is little reason to doubt the Bible's contention that there
was a substantial period in which no king ruled in the land outside
the small city-states. This was the Iron Age I period, extending
from roughly 1200 to 1000 B.C.E.22 Egyptian power in the region
ended, for all practical purposes, in about 1200 B.C.E. as a result of
the invasion of the Sea Peoples. As far as can be seen from the
extrabiblical sources, the area as a whole was free from overarching
state control during the period in question."
'9 See MARTIN NOTH, THE HISTORY OF ISRAEL 85-108 (1958) (discussing Israel's
twelve-tribe system and the institutions of that system, including common worship,
festivals, religious ceremonies, thejudicial office, divine law, punishment of transgres-
sors, tribal militia, and social order).
" Many modern scholars reject the amphictionic hypothesis, at least in the strong
form proposed by Noth. Andrew Mayes, for example, observes that the analogy is
"doubtful," even "illegitimate." Andrew D.H. Mayes, Sociology and the Old Testament,
in THE WORLD OF ANCIENT ISRAEL: SOCIOLOGICAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 52-53 (R.E. Clements ed., 1989).
See, e.g.,Judges 19-21 (describing civil war between Benjamin and the other
tribes).
2 use "B.C.E." (Before the Common Era) in place of the more conventional, but
religiously loaded, term "B.C."
23 See generally J. MAXWELL MILLER & JOHN H. HAYES, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT
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It is also plausible, as the Bible claims, that political authority
would have been exercised principally along clan or tribal lines in
those days. Any society lacking centralized institutions that claims
a monopoly in the use of force is likely to organize itself this way.
The clan grouping provides a structure of authority based on
natural family ties, facilitates the sharing of tasks (such as the
construction of buildings or agricultural facilities), and promotes
mutual self-defense. Clan groupings are observed throughout the
world in societies without a nation-state, and there is no reason to
suppose that the situation was different in Ancient Israel.
The exact nature of the kinship groups referred to in the Song
of Deborah cannot be reconstructed with certainty. A number of
groups referred to at other points in the Bible as "tribes" (shevet or
matteh) are instanced in the Song (for example, Zebulun or
Naphtali). The Song, however, does not use the standard terms for
tribes. The only subdivision referred to in a generic sense is
Zebulun, designated an "am" (a people). The omission of the
generic terms for tribes in the Song might be taken to indicate that
in the premonarchic days in which the Song may have developed,
social groupings were not as firmly structured along tribal lines as
they would be under the later administrative apparatus of the
monarchy.24  It seems unlikely, given the social setting of the
premonarchical period, that peoples would have been organized
into broad social units exercising strong governmental powers.
Social ties were probably most important at the family and village
level, with broader kinship or geographical groups exercising a less
pervasive and more sporadic influence.25 The nature of the social
groups that play a role in the Song of Deborah need not concern us
overly much, however. Clearly, some type of groups organized
across a relatively extended geographic territory were involved, and
it is not necessary to be more specific in order to present a legal-
economic rationale for key elements in the text.
Demographic and technological developments of the time
affected the tribes' incentives to enter into defensive alliances. The
period between 1200 and 1000 B.C.E. was one of rapid settlement
ISRAEL AND JUDAH 80-119 (1986).
24 Moreover, even if the social groups referred to in the Song were tribes in the
sense used elsewhere in the Bible, this leaves open the question of what, exactly, these
tribes were.2' See, e.g., MILLER & HAYES, supra note 23, at 91-93.
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in the hill country. 6 The increase in population would have been
accompanied by heightened competition for land and other
resources and, thus, would have been conducive to social conflict as
well as to collective solutions.27 Settlers might have found it useful
to form alliances with neighboring groups in order to protect their
rights against new groups.
The technology of terrace agriculture may also have played a
role in the social dynamics of the times. By building terraces to
level off sloping fields, farmers could reduce erosion, place more
land under cultivation, and increase yield. Indeed, terracing may
have been one of the factors responsible for the population growth
in the region in the first place.
2 8
Terrace agriculture required the construction of retaining walls
to hold back the soil in the terraces. This capital investment by the
farming communities evidently generated significant profits to repay
the initial expenditure. But capital investment also invited expro-
priation. Terraced fields were more valuable than unworked fields
and, accordingly, presented an attractive prize. The danger to the
small farming communities was not one of raiding and brigandage;
these communities lacked the spoils of war that raiders or brigands
would have desired. The danger, rather, was that of eviction by
other in-migrants who wanted to obtain the benefits of the existing
settlers' work.
Each individual community would have been weak militarily.
The villages were small and had essentially no defenses.29  They
were not surrounded by massive walls. The only massive works that
these communities typically erected were the retaining walls
themselves, which had little or no defensive function. In a situation
like this, it would have been only natural for the villagers to enter
' See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 361-62.
2"7 For a discussion of why collective solutions arise as a resource becomes more
valuable, see Harold Demsetz's description of how Native Americans responded
collectively by establishing property rights in hunting territories when European
demand caused the value of furs to increase. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theoly
of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 1967, at 347.
28 See G.W. Ahlstr6m, Where Did the Israelites Live?, 41J. NEAR E. STUD. 133, 133-
34 (1982); W.G. Dever, How to Tell a Canaanite from an Israelite, in THE RISE OF
ANCIENT ISRAEL 25, 25-56 (Hershel Shanks et al. eds., 1992). The idea that terracing
was an important factor in the settlement process is disputed in Finkelstein, supra
note 6, at 364.
2' See Stagersupra note 16, at 221-34 ("Real fortification walls were rare .... Most
villages relied upon their hilltop position and the surrounding terraced slopes for
defense.").
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into understandings of mutual defense with neighboring villagers
whose livelihoods would also be threatened by the possibility of
attack by hostile, land-hungry groups. Small-scale alliances would
have been established, probably based on kinship lines. These
alliances could gradually have expanded out to encompass more and
more territory.
It appears plausible that these alliances would have been
established on a religious foundation. The benefits of religion in
encouraging cooperation would have been particularly cogent in the
stateless society of Ancient Israel.-" Religious sanction enhanced
the enforceability of contracts in situations in which formal legal
enforcement was weak or lacking. Hence, the military alliance
would have been structured on a religious basis-more out of
practical necessity than piety.
In summary, it appears plausible that in the days before the
monarchy, the highlanders maintained a loose alliance for mutual
defense, an alliance that was grounded in self-interest, but that also
depended for its effective functioning on religious sanction and
norms of honor.
31
" As I have argued in prior work, executory contracts-agreements the
performance of which by one or both parties is due to take place some time in the
future-would have been difficult to enforce in these stateless times. See Miller,
Genesis, supra note 5, at 16-17.
" The confederacy does not appear to have been unique to Ancient Israel; sev-
eral of Israel's neighbors appeared to have gone through a similar phase during
their social and economic development. A number of areas settled by Aramaean
peoples at roughly the same period developed a confederacy form of government.
These included, in the recorded sources: Aram-Zobah, which flourished about
the time of the rise of the Israelite monarchy; Aram-Damascus, in the ninth cen-
tury B.C.E.; and Arpad, in the mid-eighth century B.C.E. See generally A. Mala-
mat, The Aramaeans, in PEOPLES OF OLD TESTAMENT TIMES 134,141-47 (D.J. Wiseman
ed., 1973). It is possible that Aramaean confederacies were established, at about
the same time as the settlement period recorded in the Book ofJudges, in Canaan's
immediate neighboring territories of Moab, Ammon, and Edom, lands that were
being settled by Aramaean immigrants during this period. Indeed, there is reason
to believe that the hill country of Canaan was itself settled by in-migrating Ara-
maean peoples, among others. The Bible itself records an Aramaean influence in the
region: Abraham comes to Canaan from Harran, in the territory settled by
Aramaeans, and Jacob's wives come from Aram-naharaim in the same region. See
Genesis 11:32, 24:10. It is possible that the initial impetus for the development
of a confederacy form of social organization in Canaan proper came from Aramaean
cultural influence.
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III. THE SONG OF DEBORAH IN THE TRIBAL CONFEDERACY
I now turn to a more specific analysis of the Song of Deborah,
analyzed in light of the theory of the economic function of
confederacies presented above. There are actually two versions of
the story in the Book of Judges: one, the poetic account found in
Judges 5, and the other, a prose account in Judges 4. Most critics
view the poem in Judges 5 as quite early. 2 The analysis presented
here is consistent with an early dating for the text because it
suggests purposes that the text may have served in the life of the
people during the early monarchy and premonarchical period. This
Article analyzes the poem in Judges 5.
A. The Constraint of Orality
The analysis of confederacies presented above suggests that any
alliance of tribes, clans, or other groups for mutual defense would
have functioned well only if there existed some reliable method for
recording the history of the participating groups in coming to the
aid of their partners. In the absence of such a historical record,
groups would not have information as to whether or not they could
rely upon others based on past performance. Such information
would be vitally important because, if a particular group understood
it could rely upon its neighbors, it could then adjust its primary
behavior accordingly-for example, by building terraces or by
foregoing investments in defensive technology, such as pits in which
to hide grain or other valuables.
Even more importantly, the reliable public recording of the
compliance record of the participating groups would have been
crucial to the establishment and continuation of the alliance in the
first place. Without such a historical recording system in place,
groups that were not subject to military pressure in a particular
instance would know that they could defect without having to pay
the price later. Moreover, all parties would understand this ex ante.
All parties would know that they could not confidently rely on their
colleagues for support in a crisis. Possessing such information, they
would have little incentive to agree to a military alliance in the first
place, and any agreement that they might enter into would not be
bonded by a sincere commitment of performance.
s2 See, e.g.,J. ALBERTO SOCGIN,JUDGES: A COMMENTARY 80 (1981).
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Thus, the existence of a recording system or tribal account
ledger of past performance would have been crucial. It would,
moreover, have been essential that such information be embodied
generally in the culture rather than simply retained in individual
memories. First, the actual instances of military exigency probably
were not that frequent. The time distortion of the far future gives
the period in question the feel of constant conflict and warfare
because cataclysms rank among the events important enough to be
encoded in the historical record. For the most part, however, the
residents of the area no doubt lived in a condition of relative peace.
Military emergencies might have happened, say, every thirty years.
Especially given the short life expectancy of the times, this is a long
time for information to be retained in individual memory. More-
over, for an alliance to be effective, the memory must record not
only the most recent conflict, but all conflicts. For information to
be reliably recorded, therefore, it would have to be embodied in the
broader culture and passed on from one generation to the next,
rather than retained only in individual memories.
A second reason why the information would have to be
embodied in the broader culture is that memory is not only fallible
and short, but also subject to the distorting effects of self-interest.
Let us say that one group decided to defect in a given case. Even
at the time of action, human nature supplies plentiful excuses and
rationalizations. In the Iron Age, as in the present, the alchemy of
human imagination could only too readily transform the base metal
of self-interest into altruistic gold. Although there is no cure for the
tendency to justify oneself and blame others, the problem can be
mitigated if the events in question are recorded in a public medium
of broad distribution. The public review of such information is
likely to weed out the most egregiously self-serving accounts and to
introduce a degree of balance in judgment.
A final reason why it would behoove an alliance to disseminate
a historical record in a broader culture is that the record might
reach parties who contemplate an incursion or raid on the territory
under the right conditions. Members of the alliance would want the
record to be disclosed to potential enemies because enemies,
observing the existence of a well-functioning system for recording
intertribal obligations, would conclude that they might encounter a
cohesive resistance from affiliated groups if they did initiate
hostilities. Ironically, a public record of past defaults by one or
another of the affiliated groups would not be a sign of weakness,
but of strength, because it would indicate that the confederacy was
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maintaining its records in good order and that the members of the
confederacy would do their share rather than risk disapprobation
from peers and potential loss of their rights to future protection.
These problems of memory and historical record occur in all
societies and present difficulties for all forms of confederacy. In
developed societies, even in ancient times, the problems were
addressed by means of an official archive of written recordsss In
Ancient Israel before the establishment of a monarchy, however, an
official archive of this sort was not possible. The culture lacked the
institutions ordinarily necessary for the functioning of such a
record, including a capital city, a king, and courts with the power to
interpret and apply the law. Moreover, the hill country of Canaan,
where the society of Ancient Israel developed, was almost certainly
home to an oral rather than a written culture. 4 Other than a few
Bronze Age cities, such as Jerusalem or Shechem, the territory at
the time was rural rather than urban, with most settlements taking
the form of tiny hamlets of a few dozen souls.3 5 Literacy in such
a culture would not have been at a premium, and there is little
evidence that reading and writing were widespread.
In an oral culture, the problem of maintaining a historical
record is particularly severe because the necessary information
cannot be written down and referred to as needed. It must be
maintained in the memories of individuals and passed reliably from
one generation to the next. Storage of information in human
memories is costly because of limited capacity. We thus expect to
observe a compression of meaning in oral cultures-an economy of
expression that reflects the costs of recordation more than the
demands of aesthetics. We can expect to observe information
coded in mnemonic forms, such as narratives, stories, or poems,
which are easier to recall than dry facts. There is reason to suppose
that a significant amount of the early biblical material reflects these
demands of information storage in an oral tradition."6 Finally, the
" Several official archives have been unearthed in Mesopotamia, which have
yielded a rich store of clay tablets containing business, legal, and other records that
the culture needed to preserve in authoritative form. A fascinating biblical account
of the importance of the central archive in the legal and political life of an ancient
nation-state is found in Ezra 6, which describes an official search of the Persian state
archives that uncovered a memorandum of King Cyrus authorizing the reconstruction
of the Temple; it is apparent that the written record itself was deemed authoritative
and that memories of the decree were insufficient.
s' See Miller, Genesis, supra note 5, at 17 n.7.
35 See AHLsTROM, supra note 5, at 349-54.
"For analysis of compression of meaning and mnemonic form in early legally
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existence of an oral culture provides an additional reason for the
public dissemination of information; the greater the number of
people who know a particular text, the less the likelihood that the
text will be altered by any one individual.
When we turn to the Song itself, we find that the text is in a
number of respects consistent with the predictions of theory. Most
significantly, it is a poem. The use of rhythm, chiasmus, imagery,
repetition, parallelism, and poetic phrasing facilitates memorization
(compare the poem in Judges 5 with the prose account in Judges 4).
It is plausible that the text itself, which is in the form of a vaunt
sung by the victorious prophetess, would have been memorized and
performed most particularly by women; this would have lent drama
and interest to the performance, while at the same time drawing on
female as well as male memories for key cultural information.
The text also gives us some information as to how the Song was
propagated in the culture and how the accuracy of the recordation
was maintained. Much of the early biblical literature appears to
have developed in an oral tradition in which itinerant performers
played an important part."' In the Song of Deborah, we meet these
artists face-to-face, setting up at a community well: "Hark, the
sound of the players striking up in the places where the women
draw waterl " 8 The subject of the performance is indicated as well:
"It is the victories of the Lord that they commemorate there, his
triumphs as the champion of Israel."3 9 One can almost hear excited
children running to summon their elders.
In addition to performers, information would have been carried
to remote villages of the hill country by travelers, especially
merchants, who could enhance their welcome if they proved to be
adept entertainers. The Song calls on such travelers to attend to its
message-and presumably to pass it along as they went from place
to place: "You that ride your tawny she-asses, that sit on saddle-
cloths, and you that take the road afoot, ponder this well."4"
oriented texts, see Miller, Genesis, supra note 5, at 21; for discussion of the same
rhetorical principles in cultic regulation, see Miller, Ritual, supra note 5, at 480-81.
The general economic analysis of rhetoric in an oral tradition is set forth in Miller,
Legal-Economic, supra note 5.
s' On the folklore origins of biblical texts, see SUSAN NIDITCH, UNDERDOGS AND
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The text also calls on "kings" and "princes."41 Why would
Deborah demand that foreign leaders listen to her vaunt? As
already noted, it was in the interest of the tribal confederacy for the
existence of a ledger of cooperators and defectors to be made
known to outsiders who might be tempted to invade. 2 Deborah is
warning the kings and princes of Canaan not to make the same
mistake that Sisera made in thinking that his chariots could easily
defeat an Israelite peasant army.
B. The Historical Record
As would be expected in light of the theory presented above, the
principal part of the text contains a form of a ledger in which the
performance of the different tribes in answering the call to arms is
recorded and assessed. We find a list of the tribes that responded:
Ephraim, Benjamin, Manasseh (Machir), Issachar, Zebulun,
Naphtali. 4 Those that answered are praised.4' Those that did not
respond are listed also: Reuben, Gilead (named here as a separate
tribe but possibly identical with Gad),4  Dan, and Asher.4" An
unknown group, Meroz, is cursed for not coming. One impor-
tant tribe, Judah, is not mentioned at all.
What are we to make of this list? In an important analysis,
Lawrence Stager argues that the nonparticipating tribes opted out
because of their economic dependence on settled populations:
Gilead and Reuben were nomadic pastoralists that depended on
trade with the surrounding urban centers, and Asher and Dan were
seafaring tribes also bound by ties to coastal Canaanite or Philistine
settlements. 48 The tribes that did participate, on the other hand,
were more economically self-sufficient and therefore had less to lose




41 See supra text preceding note 33.
41 SeeJudges 5:14-:18.
"See id. 5:2, 9.
45 For the possible relationship between Gilead and Gad, see Lawrence E. Stager,
The Song of Deborah: Why Some Tribes Answered the Call and Others Did Not, 15
BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV. 52, 53 (1989).
' SeeJudges 5:16-:17.
41 See id. 5:23.
41 See Stager, supra note 45, at 63.
49 See id. at 62; Stager, supra note 16, at 224.
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Stager's insightful hypothesis provides a convincing explanation
for why some tribes did not participate. In addition to the presence
(or absence) of relations with the surrounding non-Israelite centers,
however, geography played a role-a point that is perfectly consis-
tent with Stager's theory. This role was a conflict over trade routes,
as the Song itself indicates;5 ° the struggle was evidently for control
over the most important highway linking Egypt with the Beqa
Valley, and thence to locations in Mesopotamia.5  Naphtali,
Zebulun, and Issachar, located in the vicinity of Mount Tabor, were
directly threatened by the Canaanite incursion. 2 Not surprisingly,
they participated. Benjamin, Machir, and Ephraim, also partici-
pants, were fairly close geographically, and were probably linked to
those three by closer economic and political ties than were the
tribes that did not participate. s
Two tribes did not come because they were coastal entities that,
apparently, were not threatened by a Canaanite raid into the
interior even though their territories were fairly close to the battle:
Dan "tarr[ied] by the ships" and Asher "lingered by the sea-shore."
54
Gilead remained "camped beyond Jordan"-east of the action.
55
And Reuben, far to the south, was split into factions and chose to
"linger by the cattle-pens to listen to the shrill calling of the
shepherds."5M Judah and the lesser tribes of Simeon are not
mentioned at all-they were either so far away to the south that the
obligations of the confederacy were not binding, or they were not
part of the confederacy at all.
Why would the Song of Deborah publicize widespread opting-
out, if its function was to enhance the effective functioning of the
organization and to provide warning to potential enemies to keep
away? For the reason already noted: although the existence of
defections might be seen as a sign of weakness, the promulgation
and propagation of a text in which the defectors are identified and
o See Judges 5:6 ("[I]n the days of Shamgar of Beth-anath, in the days of Jacl,




See DAVID A. DORSEY, THE ROADS AND HIGHWAYS OF ANCIENT ISRAEL 94-95
(1991).
11 See MILLER & HAYES, supra note 23, at 99 map 8.
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criticized was a mark of strength because it indicated that defection
would not go unpunished or cooperation unrewarded.
IV. SUBSEQUENT USES OF THE TEXT
So far, I have argued that the Song of Deborah constituted a
form of recordation in an oral ledger-book of the rights and
obligations that arose out of a particular battle in the life of Ancient
Israel. It is quite evident, however, that the Song must have served
broader purposes. Over the course of the tribal confederacy there
must have been a number of battles, each of them recorded in some
fashion. Indeed, the Bible contains other accounts of battles in
which some tribes participated and others did not; the most
important is the story of Gideon, where Asher, Zebulun, Naphtali,
and Ephraim join Manasseh in combating the Amalekites and the
Midianites.5" Most probably, these and other accounts of battles
now lost were woven together in historical song-cycles that itinerant
troubadours would perform as they moved from place to place.
Although such histories are now lost, there is evidence that at one
time the account books were kept with some regularity. The Bible
speaks of a Book of Jashar,5 8 which appears to have been a collec-
tion or anthology of poems commemorating important events in the
Israelite confederation, and also a Book of the Wars of Yahweh,5 9
which contained, among other things, a boundary list for the
Northern tribes. Although our knowledge of this book is extremely
rudimentary, it appears to have been concerned with maintaining
the regularity of relationships among the northern tribes, and thus
to have fulfilled the general function of an account ledger of
intertribal rights and obligations.
Why would the Song of Deborah have been retained when most
of the other accounts were lost? It is possible that at some point
during the history of Ancient Israel the Song of Deborah became so
well known in the society, and achieved such prestige, that its
function as a ledger-entry for a particular battle became superseded.
It would have been convenient for the residents of the hill country
'" SeeJudges 6:33-:40. According to this story, however, all the tribes who received
the call to battle responded; Gideon did not summon the nonparticipants. See also
the story ofJephthah, who failed to summon the Ephraimites (to their displeasure
after the fact) on the ground that "had I appealed to you for help, you would not
have saved us." Judges 12:2.
5 SeeJOSHUA 10:13.
59 See NUMBERS 21:14-:15.
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to share authoritative texts that set forth the nature of their
obligations toward one another. Such texts would have had a
function similar to that of a constitution in modem societies, in that
they would have been deeply embedded in the culture and would
have defined fundamental political powers and responsibilities.
Given the obvious importance of the Song of Deborah, as evidenced
by its preservation in an oral tradition and its subsequent placement
in the national epic, it is plausible that the Song itself played this
constitutional role. If all the tribes of the hill country accepted the
authenticity, legitimacy, and prestige of the Song, then the Song
itself would have an important role in encouraging participation in
intertribal obligations in future cases.
By the time of the monarchy, however, this constitutional role
for the Song would again have become superseded. Indeed, the
kings of Israel and Judah had every reason to undermine and
disparage the preexisting political regime. The tribal confederacy
would have been inconvenient to the monarchy on several counts.
First, it validated the authority of judges, who were self-appointed,
charismatically endowed leaders who arose from among the
populace. No king ruling according to dynastic succession would
relish the continuation of this sort of office, even in the imagination
of the people, much less in reality.
A second reason why the Israelite kings would have wanted to
downplay the value of the judges is that the institution of the judge
was dependent for its functioning on the cooperation of tribes, and
thus, implicitly, on the authority of the tribal elders. The monarchy,
with its centralizing focus, would have been hostile to any system
that enhanced the authority of tribal elders, whose role was
naturally in tension with the power of a king.
Finally, royal ideology would have been hostile to the era of the
judges simply because, to the extent that the society was seen as
functioning adequately without a king, this perception undermined
one important argument for the legitimacy of the kingship as a
social institution.
Given these considerations, why did the author of the national
epic elect to include hero stories about the judges, and, in particu-
lar, why did this author reproduce the Song of Deborah? The
answer appears to be two-fold.
First, the epic needed to gain acceptance and legitimacy from
the people, and the people would have expected to hear the familiar
stories of Israelite folk heroes in any authoritative history. Thus,
the author had no real choice but to include some of these stories.
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The Song of Deborah, which appears to be the most ancient and
probably the best loved of the stories, would naturally have been
among those selected for inclusion. Moreover, by including the
Song of Deborah and other well-known tales, the author of the epic
was able to claim some of the prestige and legitimacy that the
culture already attached to the stories. The Song of Deborah had
the function, therefore, of helping to self-authenticate the national
epic.
A second reason for including these stories is somewhat more
subtle. The Book of Judges as a whole tells the reader that while
victories may come to the tribal confederacy, they were inevitably
followed by more peril. Trade was again threatened. Brigandage
or invasion were not eradicated by the tribal confederacy.6
Although the battles described in the Book of Judges are, for the
most part, stunning victories for the Israelites, any sophisticated
audience at the time of its creation would have seen that the
Israelite confederacy had proved a military disaster. The audience
would understand, from an evaluation of the stories in the Book of
Judges as a whole, that external threats can only be realistically
suppressed by a standing army, something that was lacking in the
period of the Judges but that was possible in the days of David and
Solomon and their successors.
Thus, the implicit message of the Song of Deborah, as incorpo-
rated into the Book of Judges by an author associated with the
Israelite monarchy, is that the tribal confederacy did a poor job of
protecting the people. The elite classes to whom this message was
principally addressed would have understood the Song, in the
context of the times, as an argument in favor of the kingship and
against the confederacy.
Thus, the Song of Deborah, along with the other hero stories in
the Book of Judges, can be understood as being embedded in the
national epic for purposes quite different from those that animated
its original creation and propagation in the culture. The Book of
Judges can be analogized to the American Federalist Papers, which
analyze confederacies at length in order to demonstrate the
superiority of a centralized, powerful nation state. This thesis,
however, requires substantiation through evaluation of texts other
' Thus, foreign aggressors repeatedly rise up to threaten the Israelites in the
period of thejudges. See e.g.,Judges 3:7-:9 (Cushan-rishathaim);Judgs 3:12 (Eglon);
Judges 4 (Jabin);Judges 6 (Median);Judges 11:4 (Ammon);Judges 13 (Philistines).
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than the Song of Deborah, and accordingly takes us past the limits
of analyzing this particular text.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the Song of Deborah from the
standpoint of legal-economic theory. I argue that this text, like
others that must have been extant in the society at the time, arose
as an oral recordation in a sort of cultural ledger-book of the rights
and duties of Israelite tribes within a loose alliance for military
support. The text illustrates a number of features whose presence
would be predicted by legal-economic theory. It is couched in
mnemonic form suitable for easy recordation in the culture. It
contains injunctions that it receive widespread publicity, as would
be necessary if it were to serve its purpose of facilitating the
continued existence of the tribal alliance. Later in the history of
Ancient Israel, the Song may have come to serve a broader purpose
than merely recording tribal participation or nonparticipation in a
particular battle; it may have come to constitute, in some culturally
embedded fashion, the obligations of the entire Israelite society to
provide help and assistance to one another in times of military
exigency. Thus, the Song could have operated in a fashion loosely
analogous to a constitution of the society.
After the establishment of a monarchy in the region, the Song
appears to have undergone a further transformation. The tribal
confederacy was superseded and, indeed, had become antithetical
to the rule of the Israelite monarchs. -The Song, however, was
embedded in the national epic of the Israelite people, along with
other material, as a means of authenticating and lending prestige to
the text. The Song, moreover, appears within the framework of the
Book of Judges as part of an argument against the efficacy of the
tribal confederacy as a form of social organization, because in the
absence of a strong central authority and a standing army, the
confederacy was constantly and repeatedly threatened by military
aggression from without. These arguments, I believe, satisfy the
criteria for interpretation set out earlier in this Article: They are
consistent with themselves, the text of the Bible, the findings of
modern archaeology, and general patterns of human behavior.
6 1
Overall, I have tried to show that legal-economic theory can offer a
useful perspective on the historical functions of this fascinating
61 See supra text following note 18.
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biblical text. The tools of legal-economic analysis allow us to
understand the Song of Deborah as an important mechanism by
which norms were established, transmitted, and enforced in the
society of ancient Israel.
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APPENDIX
BOOK OF JUDGES: THE SONG OF DEBORAH
62
5 That day Deborah and Barak son of Abinoam sang this song:
2 For the leaders, the leaders in Israel,
for the people who answered the call,
bless ye the LORD.
3 Hear me, you kings; princes, give ear;
I will sing, I will sing to the LORD.
I will raise a psalm to the LORD the God of Israel.
4 0 LORD, at thy setting forth from Seir,
when thou camest marching out of the plains of Edom,
earth trembled; heaven quaked;
the clouds streamed down in torrents.
5 Mountains shook in fear before the LORD, the lord of Sinai,
before the LORD, the God of Israel.
6 In the days of Shamgar of Beth-anath,
in the days of Jael, caravans plied no longer;
men who had followed the high roads
went round by devious paths.
7 Champions there were none,
none left in Israel,
until I, Deborah, arose,
arose, a mother in Israel.
8 They chose new gods,
they consorted with demons.
Not a shield, not a lance was to be seen
in the forty thousand of Israel.
9 Be proud at heart, you marshals of Israel;
you among the people that answered the call,
bless ye the LORD.
10 You that ride your tawny she-asses,
that sit on saddle-cloths,
and you that take the road afoot,
ponder this well.
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THE SONG OF DEBORAH
11 Hark, the sound of the players striking up
in the places where the women draw water!
It is the victories of the LORD that they commemorate there,
his triumphs as the champion of Israel.
12 Down to the gates came the LORD's people:
'Rouse, rouse yourself, Deborah,
rouse yourself, lead out the host.
Up, Barakl Take prisoners in plenty,
son of Abinoam.'
13 Then down marched the column and its chieftans,
the people of the LORD marched down like warriors.
14 The men of Ephraim showed a brave front in the vale,
crying, 'With you, Benjamin! Your clansmen are here!'
From Machir down came the marshals,
from Zebulun the bearers of the musterer's staff.
15 Issacharjoined with Deborah in the uprising,
Issachar stood by Barak;
down into the valley they rushed.
But Reuben, he was split into factions,
great were their heart-searchings.
16 What made you linger by the cattle-pens
to listen to the shrill calling of the shepherds?
17 Gilead stayed beyond Jordan;
and Dan, why did he tarry by the ships?
Asher lingered by the sea-shore,
by its creeks he stayed.
18 The people of Zebulun risked their very lives,
so did Naphtali on the heights of the battlefield.
19 Kings came, they fought;
then fought the kings of Canaan
at Taanach by the waters of Megiddo;
no plunder of silver did they take.
20 The stars fought from heaven,
the stars in their courses fought against Sisera.
21 The Torrent of Kishon swept him away,
the Torrent barred his flight, the Torrent of Kishon;
march on in might, my soul!
22 Then hammered the hooves of his horses,
his chargers galloped, galloped away.
23 A curse on Meroz, said the angel of the LORD;
a curse, a curse on its inhabitants,
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because they brought no help to the LORD,
no help to the LORD and the fighting men.
24 Blest above women be Jael,
the wife of Heber the Kenite;
blest above all women in the tents.
25 He asked for water: she gave him milk,
she offered him curds in a bowl fit for a chieftan.
26 She stretched out her hand for the tent-peg,
her right hand to hammer the weary.
With the hammer she struck Sisera, she crushed his head;
she struck and his brains ebbed out.
27 At her feet he sank down, he fell, he lay;
at her feet he sank down and fell.
Where he sank down, there he fell, done to death.
28 The mother of Sisera peered through the lattice,
through the window she peered and shrilly cried,
'Why are his chariots so long coming?
Why is the clatter of his chariots so long delayed?'
29 The wisest of her princesses answered her,
yes, she found her own answer:
30 'They must be finding spoil, taking their shares,
a wench to each man, two wenches,
booty of dyed stuffs for Sisera,
booty of dyed stuffs,
dyed stuff, and striped, two lengths of striped stuff-
to grace the victor's neck.'
31 So perish all thine enemies, 0 LORD;
but let all who love thee be like the sun rising in strength.
The land was at peace for forty years.
